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Abstract
Based on a direct observation study of eight CEOs for large corporations, this paper
examines how control is exercised in the era of financial transparency. In particular,
the link between corporate governance and managerial work is investigated. The
CEOs felt accountable for the company performance to exchange market actors.
Inside their own companies the CEOs governed through setting and maintaining
expectations rather then relying on centralised decision-making and giving
instructions. Subordinate managers were given discretion, but their performance was
closely watched and they had to fulfil expectations. This resulted in self-sacrificing
work in the management cadre but also in conformity and non-constructive
communication. In the end of the paper, the effects of managing by expectations are
discussed with regard to issues about governance ethics, organizational learning and
work balance.
Descriptors: managerial work, managerial behaviour, corporate governance,
expectations, accountability
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Expectations and accountability in managerial work
Introduction and theoretical framework
During the last decades financial markets have boomed and so have professions such
as financial analysts, equity brokers and business journalists. The increasing
importance of financial markets has been viewed as a social movement where new
actors acquire influence over economic activities using concepts such as corporate
governance, shareholder value and transparency (Davies and Thompson 1994).
The proponents of shareholder value regard the main task for corporations to create
wealth for the shareholder and argue that the shareholders should have the final say
about the strategic development of the companies (Barnard 1991, Copeland et al
1990). In this paper, which is based on direct observation of 8 Swedish CEOs for large
private companies, the link between financially oriented corporate governance and
top managerial work is examined. The shareholder value-movement has been
influential in many countries in the Western world during the 1990s with Sweden as
no exception (Boman 1999; Brodin et al 2000; Carlsson 2001). However, the effect of
the shareholder value movement on the actual work of business leaders has not been
examined thoroughly before.
Business executives as administrators, decision-makers, leaders and expectations
handlers
Earlier research about top executives has produced different interpretations about
the defining characteristics of their roles. A classic approach is to view them as
administrators who plan, organise and co-ordinate (Fayol 1916/1949; Gulick and
Urwick 1937). A second direction focussed on attention towards the concept of
decision-making (Simon 1947; March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963). The
decision-making perspective was particularly dominant during the post war boom
and guided many empirical studies of managerial work (Carlson 1951; Campbell et
al 1970; Mintzberg 1973).
A third approach gained popularity around 1980 emphasising leadership as the
primary role of top leaders as a response to perceived difficulties of competitiveness
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and stifling regulations (Czarniawska-Joerges and Wolff 1991; Barley and Kunda
1992). The probably most important book in the leadership movement was In Search
of Excellence (Peters & Waterman 1982). These authors argued with reference to
Barnard (1938) and Selznick (1957) that the main role of a top leader was to protect
and promote values through symbolic action, a point made also by several
researchers (Pfeffer 1981; Smircich and Morgan 1982). During the 1980s a growing
stream of literature was published that advocated the central importance of
leadership (Bryman 1992 and 1996).
In this paper the role of top executives is interpreted as efforts to managing internal
and external expectations. It is anticipated that successful CEOs are able to fulfil
external or internal expectations and actively mould them. The latter can, for instance
be accomplished through the external communication of a new strategy, or by
convincing subordinate managers of what is now expected from them. Although
viewing the role the top executive as an expectation handler is not actually
incompatible with any of the perspectives above, it emphasises a different
managerial role that is related to the growing importance of capital markets in new
corporate governance regimes.
The rising importance of expectations in the financial sector
The role as expectation handler is related not only to the rising influence of financials
markets, but also to changes in the financial markets themselves. In earlier periods
the investors based their investment decisions on level of yields, historical rates of
returns and financial stability to a large extent. During the last decades the investors
have become growingly oriented towards judging future prospects. The eye of the
investor has largely moved from the balance sheet to cash flow analysis, in particular
to projections of cash flow in the future. One influential book behind this new
orientation is Copeland et al (1990), in which models for forecasting cash flow are
presented. Calculations of future cash flow are of necessity based on expectations,
which can be more or less well grounded. Investors expectations of company
performance are typically investigated in stock market surveys and the average
expectation figures are compared with the actual outcome. Business reporting
constantly contains information like The profit of company X for the last quarter was
less than expected and the share was down by 6 per cent.  Its not unusual that a
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share goes down when a company presents record profit, because the expectations
were even higher.
The second major indication of the growing importance of expectations in corporate
control is the exploding market of financial instruments for handling risks such as
derivatives, options and futures. The total number of contracts of derivatives and
futures worldwide increased from 18 million 1975 to 1,8 billion 1995 (Young and
Thyes 1999). The value of this kind of instruments is solely determined by
seller/buyer expectations of future risks and returns. The perspective of future
expectations that is deeply ingrained in derivative markets has not least influenced
top executives by the rise of stock options as a central means for executive
compensation. The share of stock options in total compensation for the CEOs in
companies in the Standard & Poor 500 index increased from 25 per cent in 1992 to 40
per cent in 1998 (Financial Times, June 10 2001). The common opinion of both
practitioners and researchers is that the use of stock options has created a closer
alignment of shareholder and executive interests (Bruce and Buck 1997).
Expectations, sensemaking and alignment
Expectations are more used in everyday language than as a scientific concept.
However, the concept of expectations is a central one both in functional sociology
and leadership research.  An early emphasis on the importance of expectations and a
point of departure in this paper is Talcott Parsons essay The Motivation of Economics
Activities (Parsons 1954). Parsons describes in the essay the importance of
expectations for integrating economic activity  it is the expectations that uphold
institutions, since the well-integrated personality knows what is expected and
respects authority and legal frameworks. Parsons claims that clearly expressed
expectations lead to conformity  the higher degree of institutional integration the
greater conformity is to be expected. This does not mean that actor preference and
self-interest are of no importance, but that the expectations govern the direction of
the self-interested behaviour, implying that actors are rewarded for their fulfilment
of expectations. The expectations are mutual; actors expect each other to have
expectations and act accordingly (Wearne 1989).
Related research to this paper about expectations also includes research about
leadership and career development. Expectancy theory (Porter and Lawler 1968;
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Nadler and Lawler 1977; Pavett 1983) investigates the relation between leader
behaviour, employee expectancy, motivation and outcome. The expectations of a
leader is also a central component in contingency approaches to leadership (Chemers
1985; Stoner and Freeman 1989 p 469-70). For instance new leaders who were told
that their subordinates were low performers acted in a more authoritative manner
than leaders who were told to have high performers (Farris and Lim 1969; Eden
1984). Other examples of the importance of expectations came from researchers about
career development who report that employee expectations affect both job
satisfaction (Porter et al 1975) and career success (Rosenbaum 1989). But the most
interesting study about leadership and expectations in this setting is Becoming a
manager by Linda Hill (1992). Hill who closely followed 19 newly appointed
managers in their first year found that their major difficulty in their transition to
manager was how to reconcile between an endless number of different expectations
from superiors, peers, subordinates and also their own expectations of how they
would like to behave as a leader. Hills study clearly shows the importance of coping
with different expectations in managerial work and also the fruitfulness on focussing
on the concept of expectations as such. Also of vital importance in this setting is that
Hill analyses expectations on a more systemic level  i. e. how expectations of
different actors relate to each other  in contrast to the leadership research above that
analyses expectations in the narrower relation between a leader and his/her
followers.
Expectations should be seen as a part of actors efforts to make sense of the world
(Weick 1995). Economic actors live in a complex and demanding context and what
the environment of actors consist of is to a part produced by the actors themselves,
environments are enacted (c f Weick 1988). When actors perceive that certain
expectations are held at them, they normally feel themselves as accountable for
fulfilling the expectations.
The actors can also have expectations on other persons and hold them accountable
for these. The process in which actors deal with the issue of accountability is,
according to Munro (1996), through alignment  which is close to Parsons concept of
conformity- and through identity work; how the actors make efforts to be seen as
competent by those who they feel accountable towards. In this paper the relation
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between expectations and accountability/alignment is focussed. The theoretical
framework of the paper is summarised in Figure 1.
Figure 1  Theoretical framework
To conclude, I claim in this paper that recent changes in corporate governance,
related to the increasing role of financial markets have affected the work of top
executives, as they are held accountable for creating shareholder value. To create
shareholder value assumes that the company in question will meet or exceed
investors expectations. There are no upper limits of a satisfactory rate of returns,
only that each company should strive for being a superior investment in the eye of
the investor. I will discuss the implications for managerial work when creating
shareholder value is the primarily goal, and in particular I will emphasise the
interconnectedness between expectations, accountability and alignment between
financial market actors, CEOs and subordinate managers.
Sensemaking
Enactment
Expectations
(internal and external)
Accountability
(alignment and identity work)
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Conducting the study
The paper belongs to a study about work behaviour of CEOs, in which a replication
of the first systematic investigation made in this topic has a central place (see
Tengblad 2002b). This study was conducted by professor Sune Carlson who engaged
nine prominent Swedish business leaders in an intense diary and observation study
in the late forties (Carlson, 1951).
The empirical material for this paper primarily consists of field notes from direct
observation of the work of eight Swedish CEOs during 26 working days. The
observations covered in four cases 5 working days per participant and in the
remaining cases 1-2 days. With some few exceptions all working activities during
these days were observed. In total the observation covers little more than 300 hours
of work and a broad spectrum of different kinds of activities such as management
group meetings, public appearances, budget reviews, negotiations, management
training, meetings with investors, field visits and small talk. Also sensitive activities
such as board meetings, recruitment of managers, appraisal talks and merger
discussions were observed to a large extent.
The observations were very intensive and it was not possible to record all the
conversation due to physical limitation of keeping field notes. Sometimes it was
possible to record a dialogue in a relatively detailed manner, sometimes not. The
long days of observation were exhaustive both for the brain and for the writing hand,
a typical observation day generated about 40 pages of field notes. Despite the
impossibility of recording the complete occurrences, direct observation provides in
comparison to interviews and questionnaires a superior possibility to collect real
action (Czarniawska 1998), and to get inside the invisible rooms where leadership is
exercised (Sjöstrand et al 2001). When following a business leader during 60 hours in
a week, it is not possible to understand how all the activities relate to each other or to
gain a proper understanding of the background and reasons for the action, but one
gets a very good picture of how the business leader behaves in his daily work. The
method is thus suitable for studying individual leader behaviour rather than the
collective process of management.
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All eight participants were men and their experience of CEO positions ranged from
one to 17 years (mean eight years). They led companies in the industries of
manufacturing (2), banking and insurance (2), forestry, media, retailing and energy.
Six of these companies were listed on the Stockholm Exchange, one was jointly
owned by the companies of an industry and one was a large family business. The
mean number of employees was at time of study about 6.000 and the combined
market value of the public companies was about 20 billion Euro. Some of the
companies were truly international; three of them had more than 90 per cent of their
employees outside Sweden. These companies were also growing at a high rate, both
due to organic growth and through acquisitions.
The total workload for the CEOs was challenging. They worked on average 62 hours
per week, with an individual variation from 47 to 76 hours. They generally expressed
satisfaction about their working situation, even if they often felt pressure especially
at times when the company performance was lower than expected.
The CEOs were in general rather sporty and unpretentious. They saw taking care of
their health as a condition for coping with the job demands. With one exception they
exercised regularly. They participated in activities such as jogging, tennis, golf,
basketball, badminton, strength training and sailing. None of the CEOs smoked. All
but one had a Volvo as company car, typically not the most expensive model. A
participant saw this as a symbolic message related to the issue of handling
expectations: If you want your co-workers to have Opels you can't drive a Jaguar
yourself. Other examples of unpretentiousness were a participant who transported
his children to the day-care centre in the mornings and one participant who lived in
the working-class part of town. Their own offices were also generally more
functional than luxurious. White walls and wooden floors were the most common
interior. Their unpretentiousness may be a reflection of the fact that they in general
had had a middle-class upbringing in the countryside of Sweden.
Empirical section: Handling external expectations
In this section I will mainly discuss how the CEOs handled expectations from
exchange market actors. In the listed companies, they had regular contact with
investors, analysts and business journalists. These contacts included information
exchange in both directions. The CEOs provided information about what
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expectations of company performance that are reasonable to set and they wanted
information about what expectations the exchange market had on their company. An
illustrative case of information exchange was observed when an analyst visited a
forestry company.
Analyst:  The reason for my visit is that I want to write a company report
about your company that I want to sell to the large English investment banks.
The timing is good, the company is performing well and the knowledge about
the company is not so big
CEO: The valuation has never been lower. The problem is that analysts write
positively about the company and recommend buying, but that nothing
happens afterwards.
Analyst: You have a strength in your specialization but a drawback in your
size. In todays enormous flow of information it is easy to be forgotten.
CEO: How much bigger do we need to be attractive to the major investment
funds. Five times bigger or?
Analyst: Unfortunately it looks like that. But you have a strong balance sheet
and low investment needs. Wouldnt it be wise to make some acquisitions?
CEO: If the prize is right, we always want to make acquisitions.
Analyst: (repeating) The company is well invested, the balance sheet is strong.
Will you give the shareholders extra dividends or will you make acquisitions?
CEO: (irritated)  We are looking on acquisitions.
The CEO then starts to inform about company structure and strategic intention.
After the presentation the analyst grabs one of the OH-slide showing the
company structure and puts his hand on two of the business areas and says:
you should get ride of the pulp business and maybe also the tissue business.
CEO: What price do you want to set on our pulp mill? It has a booked value of
40 million Euro, or one Euro per share.
Analysts: I really dont know, but let me say: If you lose a half of a Euro per
share in an acquisition, then the share will definitely go up. The investors looks
to the longer terms, and are deadly frightened about the volatility in the pulp
sector.
During the meeting with the analysts who took little more than 3 hours including
lunch and a factory visit the analyst gave many other suggestions about strategic
changes in the forest company and provided information about what other analysts
concerned to be risks and opportunities for different segments in the pulp and paper
industry. In sum the meeting was packed with exchanges of expectations and the
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CEOs afterwards said that he found the comments from the analyst to be interesting
although he  thought the markets demand of stable and increasing rate of returns
was unrealistic in a volatile and capital intense business such as forestry: When we
make larger investments we expect them to hold 20-30 years and that investment
shows good profitability over the whole cycle, the market wants to see profits almost
immediately.
The participants perceived the expectations from shareholder-related actors as
demanding and discussed this issue extensively in a joint feed back session (October
8, 2000). None of the participants questioned the right of shareholders to receive
detailed information or expressed that they have gained too much power. They
recognised that a change had occurred and that some, in particularly older CEOs
were uncomfortable when explaining company strategy to 25-year old analysts. They
expressed that a CEO nowadays has to be a good salesman of the stock  although a
realistic one  in the communication with the exchange market. One participating
CEO clarified this position by saying:
Business leaders of today need the capability to communicate the story of the
company in a convincing and interesting way [but] you should not
exaggerate because you have to be there the next year also. You have to keep
the prognoses, otherwise the investors will be disappointed.
How to create a balance between moulding expectations so that the stock will
develop positively, without creating unrealistic expectations was seen as one of the
most difficult tasks for a CEO. The importance of moulding external expectations
was illustrated in an investor meeting at the producer of commercial vehicles Volvo
AB in March 2002. The CEO perceived at the end of the meeting that the presentation
might have been too successful; the audience seemed to have got a very optimistic
picture about the future of the company and he feared that this might create
expectations difficult to reach. His closing statement was therefore: If you have got a
more positive picture [about the company] than at the last meeting, then you are
wrong.1
                                                 
1 Source: Göteborgs-Posten (a leading Swedish newspaper) March 15, 2002, s. 31.
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The participants of the study often perceived the judgements of the exchange market
as unfair but they nevertheless felt obliged to try to satisfy their demands and
expectations, since they felt dependent upon investor confidence. The gain of such
confidence was related to the fulfilment of the exchange markets expectations (c f
Luhmann 1980). One case about how the participants felt accountable to exchange
market actors was observed in the retail company here called The bargain store. This
company had built a large storehouse in the centre of Sweden together with a
business partner. This location had been criticised by business journalists who
believed that this storehouse should have been located 500 kilometres further the
south. In a meeting with a representative of the business partner the CEO asked
whether it was possible to receive a dividend from the storehouse unit at the end of
the year, as proof of the economic wisdom of the location. When the representative
said that a dividend was not possible the CEO angrily stated:
If we dont get a dividend for 1999, the exchange market will cut our heads off.
In Veckans affärer [a weekly business magazine] there was a long article about
the location issue. It said that we couldnt control our costs. I have phoned
them and tried to downplay, but it will be a big issue.
The CEOs also saw advantages with the strong expectations from the exchange
market. One participant said during the feed back session that the transparency of
the companies made his organization well aware of what was needed to be done,
and that the external pressures had created a very strong force for change. This leads
us to the next topic, how the CEOs translate the external expectations and
communicate them in their own organization.
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Communicating expectations
Compared to Mintzberg (1973), the participants in the new study spent more than
twice as much time on ceremonies and giving of information  activities that provide
opportunity for the CEOs to communicate expectations (see Tengblad 2002a). The
information conveyed by the CEOs mainly had a normative touch, which included
not least the communication of expectations. Not even the CEOs of the most
successful companies were satisfied with the present state-of affairs, they still
believed the company could improve its operations substantially. They tried to
influence the organization through communication, often by using stories (Watson
1994 p. 113; Boyce 1995; Gabriel 2000).
Messages about the desired state-of affairs (for instances formulated as Ten
commandments, cornerstones, business mission or corporate vision) were
transmitted through booklets and brochures in most of the companies. Several of the
participants on the feed back session (October 8, 2000) pointed out that they regarded
organizational culture to be a very efficient tool to guide the subordinates to take the
proper action (c f Rosen 1985; Kunda 1992; Mills et al 2001). During the observations
the CEOs made numerous efforts to spread the gospel. The CEO of The bargain store
for instance constantly preached the importance of certain values that he believed
was the reasons for the relative success of the retail chain such as friendliness, service
orientation, environmental awareness and cost consciousness. He felt that the
expansion in particular to the Stockholm region posed a challenge to the core values
since the employees there in his perception were no different than those of the
competitors.
Meetings with personnel, management training sessions, management conferences,
and field visit to subsidiaries and local units provided opportunities for the CEOs to
communicate their expectations. The following excerpts were gathered from a
management conference in a multinational company that contained many occasions
when the CEO transferred external expectations to his senior management. In the
opening speech the CEO addressed the importance of meeting expectations very
explicitly:
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We have had a very good year. Results are up 35 percent. The share has risen
even more. We have such a high valuation because we have delivered what has
been expected, I think. When we don't deliver then our fun period is over. I like
you to remember what Mr. Johansson [a senior executive within the company]
once said: Sales is an estimate but profits is a promise. It has become a proverb
in our Group. We all have to meet expectations.
The importance of meeting expectations was underlined by the CEO while showing
the last OH-slide of the conference, which stated: Failure is not an option. Just
before that the CEO also declared that he was not satisfied with the sales figure for
the two first months of the quarter and that he feared that this might affect the
company's image on the stock markets as a growth company.
A last point: Our growth was only one percent in January/ February. March
last year was a very strong month. It seems like we actually are going to
present a negative growth. This will not be well received by the market.
Therefore we have to ship out as much as possible before March 31.
The CEO felt obliged to show evidence of organic growth in every report in order to
sustain the image of success and in the financial report for the first quarter the
company presented an organic growth of 2 percent, thanks to this tactical
manoeuvre. The stock took nevertheless a dive by ten percent after the report since it
was below expectations, but no major crisis of confidence arose.
The CEO also reminded the participants of the conference several times that they
were to be held accountable for meeting the expectations that he had communicated.
This concerned for instance the company performance and to the establishment of a
shared culture:
Our success is dependent on good communication at all levels in the Group.
We are all ambassadors. If the message from this conference doesn't reach
lower levels in the organization we will take the blame, but we also blame you.
You are our hostage now. You can only blame yourself if we don't succeed in
creating a group spirit.
The CEOs also communicated expectations on specific managers in dyadic
encounters. They could for instance make managers whose units did not consider
performing satisfactorily to feel a pressure to improve. During a visit to a regional
unit, the CEO of a financial company and the region director drove from the airport.
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The conversation circled about the Clinton testimony in the Lewinsky affair, but the
CEO introduced a new topic:
Changing the subject for a moment. The rationalisations plan that your
predecessor worked out in order to lower the costs, have you fulfilled that
plan?
Region director (RD): Yes we have. We have also accelerated the plan.
CEO: Our Group controller has gone through your figures and he says that the
rationalisations in this region have slowed down.
RD: No that is not the case.
CEO: Maybe youre right there.
RD: But of course, there is a certain redundancy of personnel. The competition
is also very strong, even if we have slowly increased our market share.
CEO: Otherwise one can sometimes feel a lack of a strong culture in this
region. Business orientation and thriftiness you know. And there has been a
lack of self-confidence. Everyone was talking about how good the main
competitor was.
RD: But that time has passed. Now we have strong self-confidence.
This brief encounter not only made the regional director aware that the CEO
expected improvement in his region but also that this work was carefully monitored
from the central level. How the CEOs monitor expectations in order to achieve a
general attitude of accountability and alignment among subordinates is the topic for
the next section.
Monitoring expectations
The CEOs felt that the exchange market closely monitored their work. The ongoing
verdict from the market was provided by the development of the share price. The
CEOs alignment to the financial markets was clearly expressed by the fact that they
closely followed the share fluctuations, sometimes several times per day. The CEOs
work was also monitored in surveys, in which analysts and investors ranked their
competence. The ranking list did often provide some CEO at the top of the lists with
high prestige, but negative ranking was also made. The business magazine
Aktiespararen (The Shareholder) for instance regularly survey market opinions
about the CEOs with the highest risk of getting fired.
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The CEOs spend a lot of time on monitoring how well their subordinates meet the
expectations. A vital condition for knowing how expectations are fulfilled is access to
valid information about the accountable ones. Getting information was the single
most recorded activity comprising 23% of total working time of the CEOs (Tengblad
2002b). The CEOs were eager to obtain information about both financial performance
and how well the individual manager performed his duties. In reality these aspects
often became intermingled.
The main instrument for monitoring the financial situation was the monthly
performance report. Typically this report was compared with a budget, which in turn
reflects forecasts and projections about the following year. But more importantly the
budgets were also used for setting goals and expectations. The CEOs generally
considered the budget to be an important instrument of control and they wanted to
commit their subordinates towards ambitious financial goals. When negative
deviations occurred the subordinate managers were expected to bring acceptable
arguments about the reasons for the deviation and also to be able to take measures
for closing the gap between the expectations and the actual outcome. The ideal was
to create a self-monitoring system, where subordinate managers become guardians
of expectation. In a follow up interview, one participant explained the principles of
financial control in his company:
We have a very fast accounting system. In eight days we have a monthly
performance report. It's very good because is there a problem one month which
also appears the following month, then they know I will be calling them. So
actually, you don't have to interfere much, it regulates itself.
In three companies, internal benchmarking over financial performance was used
extensively. The main purpose of benchmarking was to create a will of improvement
and a competitive spirit among the units, but it also provided the CEOs with detailed
information for monitoring and comparing the performance of subordinate
managers.
Judging managers' performance informally
One of the most frequently used techniques for monitoring was to collect informal
performance reviews. Situations when the CEOs were requesting opinions or
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captured information about other managers occurred in many different settings;
during breaks, lunches, travels, recruitment activities, management training, budget
follow-up meetings and even development talks. After a meeting for planning a golf
tournament the CEO asks a sales manager in a subsidiary about informal
information:
CEO: Something else to tell from the mill?
Sales manager:  The new guys I got are very good. A good team that like each
other.
CEO: It is not like the production manager, Mike. But he seemed energetic.
Sales manager: He knows what he wants and he is very goal-oriented, but he
cant handle people. And then one should not be a production manager. There
were conflicts all the time. He is a bit of a lonely wolf. And he made the mistake
of trying to change everything. And it went wrong. I mean, to come to a mill
where nothing works and people are dissatisfied, its a tough challenge. But
there were many who liked him and his ideas.
In an international manufacturing company I was attending a budget follow-up
meeting for the sales units. Very few figures were mentioned during the meeting.
The discussion was instead mainly about whether the responsible managers were
trustworthy and capable of the task of meeting the financial objectives:
CEO: How about Canada?
Marketing manager (MM): He will probably manage. But the targets are not
high.
CEO: He is a yellow-belly. [...] In US there are problems for the X-products.
The manager gives bad explanations. Holidays, all kinds of reasons to avoid
coming out on the field.
MM: He hasn't been out because he had problems at home.
Divisional head: But that problem has been resolved.
MM: Yes. His wife has left him now.
CEO: We have to let him put together an action plan, which we have to follow
up. [...] Brazil does not look good.
MM: He complains like hell how tough it is. But he always does that.
CEO: Whiner. What about South Africa?
Divisional head: Its awful. Bob has sent me some articles about the economic
crisis.
CEO: They usually do that when things go bad. It's called cover your ass.
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MM: But the situation is really bad. Hospitals are being closed down.
The meeting continued in this vein for more than one hour. The corporate morality in
this setting can be described as You are what you deliver! Furthermore, marital
problems should not to interfere with the commitment to the budget.
One CEO, who was praised for his good leadership manner, exemplified the great
importance of economic performance when appraising managers. The CEO
described his US manager  who controlled the single most profitable operation and
who held a reputation of managing his organization extremely hard  during a walk:
He is a brute, not quite sane actually, but he is nevertheless my best manager.
In a financial company I was attending a development/appraisal talk with the CEO
and the group controller. Such meetings are supposed to concern mutual feedback
about the co-operation between the two, but this topic was accomplished in a minute
since the controller didnt address any issue. Instead the CEO requested the financial
manager's opinion about the other members of the top management team and the
subordinates within the internal control department:
CEO: What about the units you are co-operating with?
Group controller (GC): Concerning the southern region, there is no problem,
however it's a little thin of competence around the director. Then Jan in region
East. I know him well and it's important that he has good co-workers.
CEO: How is Jan doing. It is important that it goes right. He has a large
operation.
(GC): Jan is dependent on good co-workers.
CEO: Why do you keep saying so? Is that a way of saying that he is not a good
manager?
(GC): He is not 100% in his judgements. I noticed that already when I worked
with him. Then Lars in the Western region is the one who I trust the most.
Enormously judicious.
CEO: I'm very pleased to hear that.
The development talk took 40 minutes. During this activity the group controller
assessed over 20 managers. Together with talks with the other members of the top
management team, one can suppose that the CEO possesses a very deep knowledge
of who respects whom and that he could make intricate comparisons between
collegial impressions and his own.
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To conclude; monitoring performance was a central activity for CEOs and the
performance was based extensively on how well expectations are kept  primarily
financial ones often conveyed in informal encounters.
Making expectations real: The carrot and the whip
A central part of the increasing alignment between shareholders and corporate
executives is compensation packages linked to share performance. All CEOs of the
listed companies had fairly recently joined stock options programs. For two of the
participants such programs had created personal fortunes of several tens of millions
Euro. This can be compared to the basic salaries for the CEOs of the listed companies,
which were in the range between 200.000 and 700.000 Euro. Subordinate managers
were also aligned to shareholder value as they took part in the stock option
programs.
Also rewards of a symbolic nature were used. In one company, the use of colour
slides presentations were only allowed in internal meetings if the unit performed a
return on investment of 20 percent and more. During a management development
program in this company the CEO gave another example of a symbolic reward
related to subordinate alignment to a central initiative:
Mexican manager: You mentioned that we could save money with the use of
investment co-ordination. Im going to expand the production in my factory
and maybe there are machines in the rest of the Group that can be used. Is it a
good idea to create a database over machinery available in the Group, which
can be checked out before we contact external suppliers?
CEO: An excellent idea! You will have a star in the company scorebook.
However, the increasing generosity of financial rewards seems to be linked with a
growing impatience with performances below expectations. CEOs for listed
companies in Sweden are being replaced more and more often. In 1999, when most of
the empirical work was conducted, the total turnover of CEOs at the Stockholm
Exchange was 19%2, a twice as high proportion compared to the 60s and 70s
                                                 
2 Source: Svenska Dagbladet, 27th of October, 2000
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(Holmberg 1986). The new practice that more and more implies that CEOs are
replaced when there is a belief that someone else is better suited for the job did affect
many of the participants in the study. Two years after the study, only two of the six
CEOs (for the listed companies) were still working as CEOs. Two of the successions
were related to age but two participants were forced to resign.
That the increasing impatience with under-performing CEOs also affects managers
at lower level is indicated in interviews with CEOs in another Swedish study
(Trollestad, 2001). It is a fairly widespread opinion in Sweden that the turnover of
managers has increased substantially and that managers that perform below
expectations are legitimate quarries. This can be related to an overall development
in many Western countries. Regular dismissals of under-performers are for instance
a central part of the management philosophy of the much heralded shareholder
value champion Jack Welch (Welch 2001). Also fairly recent studies about middle
managers in the UK, report that middle managers often feel that they are subject to
excessive pressures (Scase and Goffee 1989 p 63; Watson 1994).
Some of the participating CEOs were engaged in dismissals of subordinate managers
during the study. A situation that concerned dismissals is collected from a
manufacturing company who had decided to cut headcount in a marketing staff.
Three positions should become two but the person least wanted was protected by the
Swedish Law of employment security:
Marketing manager (MM): The problem is that with his education and years of
service he can claim that someone else should leave.
CEO: What is his education?
MM: He is an MBA.
CEO: He has hidden that well.
MM: You don't know him.
CEO: Maybe I don't. But he is too much an 8 to 5 person and perhaps a little
too rigid. But the job may no longer be a challenge for him.
MM: When he arrived, things were in mess and then he worked hard.
It was decided to offer the unwanted person a new position in the expectation that he would
regard the terms as unacceptable and that he would leave voluntarily. The episode also
illustrates how CEOs communicates expectations indirectly in their action: The value of
hardworking was expressed and no 8 to 5 attitude was accepted.
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Before dismissals are considered the CEOs could show dissatisfaction in straight
talk. This was the case during an effort of acquisition when a CEO phones his
country manager in Germany. One matter dealt with whether the country manager
should move to the town in which the prospective company had its head-quarters.
Unfortunately it was impossible to record the answers from the country manager,
but the excerpt clearly shows that the CEO communicated expectations about total
commitment:
What is the total cost of the company at a stock price of 50 francs?
You don't know! Haven't you studied the deal, then it is no use for us to
discuss.
I will not accept that as an alibi for not taking care of the cost structure and for
you to move there. If the enthusiasm isn't larger than this, we are in trouble.
You should be prepared to move to Africa if I ask you to!
The telephone call continues with some other items. Then the CEO asks:
How big savings are you counting on within three years?
 But you must have made some plans about cost reductions?
No calculations have been done! This is so indifferent. We can't make an
acquisition without having an opinion whether it is a good deal.
I don't understand your argument. Maybe you don't either. You have to take
charge, otherwise we'll send someone from Stockholm!
You can't blame someone else. You have to be engaged in this deal. I have felt
before that you are tired and uncommitted. If I should be in a deal like this, I
would have worked night and day. Haven't I the right to demand you to work
your guts out? You should phone me by four o'clock, and then be informed!
Put everything else aside.
After the call the CEO described the country manager to me as a fat and lazy
farmer's cat, who one has to be little cruel to so that he understands what is
required.
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Employee responses towards expectations: Alignment and
conformity
It was more a rule than an exception that subordinate managers carefully listened to
the CEO and then concurred with him. This alignment orientation often led to a lack
of critical and constructive discussions, even when the CEO tried to encourage such
discussions. In one company, an attempt to acquire a Nordic competitor was
conducted during the observation period. During the monthly group-management
meeting the CEO presented the deal. He received only joyous acclamation.
CEO:  [...] To conclude, this deal represents one of the last opportunities to
acquire a midsize competitor in this country. After that, there are only big
players left. What are your opinions?
Manager 1: There is large confidence for our way of doing business and this
goodwill will help us succeed in this deal.
Manager 2: It must be the right way.
Manager 3: Nobody can question our competence in this area.
Manager 4: Are we not already viewed as a domestic company (in the country
in question)
CEO: Are some of you guys prepared to move there?
Silence
CEO: It is a challenging task. We will discuss the position with John. What do
you think of him?
Manager 5: He is stable.
Manager 2: He knows the market very well and is in his prime.
Manager 6: He is a suitable candidate.
However, the acquisition effort failed. The Board of the targeted company viewed it
as a hostile take-over and a white knight was invited. The outcome might have been
different if a more constructive discussion had taken place in the management group
about possible reactions from the targeted company and from competitors.
A second excerpt emanates from a recruitment interview for a position as assistant
project-leader in a business development team. After the meeting the administrative
manager, the project leader and an external consultant in hierarchical order connect
their opinions to those of the CEO:
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The candidate leaves the room
Silence (five to ten seconds)
The CEO: I think this will be good. And she is a structure fanatic.
Administrative manager: I think this is going to be very good.
Project leader: This will be good.
Administrative manager: She had the right attitude, did you notice that?
External consultant: She has straight hair. The straighter the hair is, the more
structured one is. (The consultant had a crew cut).
A consequence of that subordinate managers often do not say what they really think,
but what they feel is expected of them, is that CEOs mostly receive information that
reinforce their world-view. The problem of yes man-ship is not new (see Burns &
Stalker 1961: 212 for a thorough discussion in the matter), but it can be anticipated to
become a larger problem in organizations that are characterised by impatience,
sudden dismissals and strong demands on accountability and alignment.
Conformity in managerial work that has been discussed by Whyte (1956) and Dalton
(1959) as related to group-orientation in business life (Human relations) and by
Kanter (1977) and Hannaway (1989) as a consequence of bureaucratic organising can
in this study also be related to high performance pressures. The CEOs expect total
commitment and feeling of accountability from their direct reporting managers. The
stress on accountability led to organizational behaviour characterised by alignment
and discipline rather than openness and creativity.
The tendency towards alignment to conformity can be expected to have a negative
impact on creativity and innovation capacity. Researchers have argued that exchange
markets tend to overemphasise short-term gains in relation to long-term investments
in R & D (Hansen and Hill 1991; Short and Keasey; 1997). It may also be the case that
clearly expressed and demanding expectations, regardless whether they are short-
term oriented or not, can hamper long-term development, since such expectations 
as Parsons (1954) suggests  lead to conformity.
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Conclusion and implications
The empirical descriptions show that the work of CEOs is governed by external
expectations, particularly from the exchange market. The CEOs often enacted their
environment as unfriendly and highly competitive and this reflected their work.
They were aligned to the expectations of the exchange market by an ideological
commitment to the principles of shareholders value, by financial rewards and the
risk of getting fired.
Even if cognitive dispositions of the CEOs was not in focus in this study, it was
obvious that they had developed a set of ideas about what's important, which in line
with Kotter (1982) can be labelled as agendas. The common content of these
agendas was growth, concentration on core-businesses, excellent return on
investments and high productivity. The CEOs felt that they were part of a play with
huge stakes and this meant that there was not much room for either strategic
visioning or considerate leadership. They had very long working days but still little
time for their personal development.
The CEOs made many attempts to implement the agendas by using different means
of influencing the organization each working day. These interventions seldom had
the character of formal decision-making and giving of orders. Instead the CEOs
made clear what they felt was important by communicating expectations and they
often used stories when preaching values. The CEOs expected their subordinates to
work very hard and be fully committed towards the financial objectives. The sense of
accountability and the need of alignment were always present.
What are the implications from these observations? Firstly, there are reasons to
believe that shareholders expectations about performance above average also have
impacts on the daily conditions for non-managers. There is a need to further study
how such expectations are channelled into the daily work of the employees. In
Sweden there are many indications of rising demands on the individual employee
and this phenomenon is not only related to listed companies. There has been a
substantial rise in the level of absenteeism due to work related stress in most sectors
of the labour market, not least in education and health care. Exhaustion and burnout
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have become the fastest growing causes for long-term absenteeism
(Näringsdepartementet 2001: 160). In a national survey from 1999 45 percent of
employees responded that they felt physically exhausted every week and the same
percentage couldnt dismiss job from thoughts when off work (Statistics Sweden,
2001: 242).
Secondly, the organizational effects of high performance pressures need to be
investigated closely. From an investor point of view there is a need of knowledge
about unintended consequences of high performance pressure, which can led to
conformity, loss of innovation and the milking of business. There is also a need for a
discussion on a societal level about corporate control that also takes other interests
into account than those of the investors. Above all, CEOs have a moral obligation to
reconcile between different demands and expectations. They should not passively
align themselves to shareholder demands, but together with shareholders and other
constituents try to achieve a balance between alignment to shareholder expectations
on one hand and creativity, open communication, innovation and sustainable work
conditions on the other hand. This may be a challenging task for the CEOs and senior
management in these days of index capitalism that requires both courage and good
ethics, but nevertheless have a key role for shaping the organizations of the future.
Thirdly, the phenomenon of expectations deserves larger scholarly attention, not
least from researchers from a post-modern perspective who want to understand the
reflexivity of todays society. In functional sociology  such as Talcott Parsons 
expectations was something that created harmony and integration as societies
became more advanced (Wearne 1989).  But expectations can also lead to changes
that create tensions and conflicts of interests in society. For instance, it was large
pension-funds for public employees as CalPERS who initiated the corporate
governance movement that aimed to align executives to the interests of the
shareholders (Carlsson, 2001). Thus employees are today affected by harsh demands
on performance because the same employees in different settings want to have a
good return on their retirement savings. But, whether the employees also want to
sacrifice job security, and good working conditions in return for higher standard of
living as pensioners is questionable. And if the impatience with low return on
investments further increases, there will be even more dismissals of fund managers,
CEOs, corporate managers and employees performing below index. As Karl Weick
(1995:  189) has put it: Expectations are real.
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